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Abstract 21 
The production of beneficial public goods is common in the microbial world, and so is 22 
cheating – the exploitation of public goods by non-producing mutants. Here, we examine co-23 
evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and cheats and ask whether cooperators can 24 
evolve strategies to reduce the burden of exploitation, and whether cheats in turn can 25 
improve their exploitation abilities. We evolved cooperators of the bacterium Pseudomonas 26 
aeruginosa, producing the shareable iron-scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, together with 27 
cheats, defective in pyoverdine production but proficient in uptake. We found that 28 
cooperators managed to co-exist with cheats in 56% of all replicates over approximately 150 29 
generations of experimental evolution. Growth and competition assays revealed that co-30 
existence was fostered by a combination of general adaptions to the media and specific 31 
adaptions to the co-evolving opponent. Phenotypic screening and whole-genome re-32 
sequencing of evolved clones confirmed this pattern, and suggest that cooperators became 33 
less exploitable by cheats because they significantly reduced their pyoverdine investment. 34 
Cheats, meanwhile, improved exploitation efficiency through mutations blocking the costly 35 
pyoverdine-signalling pathway. Moreover, cooperators and cheats evolved reduced motility, 36 
a pattern that likely represents adaptation to laboratory conditions, but at the same time also 37 
affects social interactions by reducing strain mixing and pyoverdine sharing. Overall, we 38 
observed parallel evolution, where co-existence of cooperators and cheats was enabled by a 39 
combination of adaptations to the abiotic and social environment and their interactions.  40 
 41 
Keywords: microbial cooperation, siderophores, experimental evolution, antagonism, 42 
cheating resistance, whole-genome resequencing 43 
  44 
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Introduction 45 
Bacteria frequently cooperate by forming multicellular fruiting bodies and biofilms, and by 46 
secreting shareable metabolites to digest food, scavenge essential metals, and attack 47 
competitors (West et al., 2007; Nadell et al., 2009; Velicer & Vos, 2009; Strassmann & 48 
Queller, 2011). These cooperative traits are typically beneficial for the community, but can 49 
also be exploited by cheating mutants that stop contributing to costly cooperation, whilst still 50 
capitalizing on the cooperative acts performed by others (West et al., 2006). This raises the 51 
question of how cooperation can be maintained given the pervasive risk of cheat exploitation. 52 
Previous studies have identified a number of ecological and social factors, including resource 53 
availability (Brockhurst et al., 2008; Kümmerli et al., 2009c; Xavier et al., 2011), limited 54 
dispersal (Griffin et al., 2004; Gilbert et al., 2007; MacLean & Brandon, 2008; Kümmerli et al., 55 
2009b) and cell density (Greig & Travisano, 2004; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2009), that can tip 56 
the balance in favour of cooperation. In contrast to these extrinsic drivers of cooperation, 57 
relatively little is known on whether cooperators and cheats can directly adapt to one 58 
another, and co-exist under conditions that would normally favour cheating (Zhang et al., 59 
2009; Khare et al., 2009; Hollis, 2012; Levin et al., 2015). 60 
 61 
Here, we investigate whether cooperators and cheats co-evolve, eventually engaging in 62 
antagonistic co-evolution, as it is typically observed in host-parasite interactions 63 
(Decaestecker et al., 2007; Schulte et al., 2010; Gomez & Buckling, 2011; Morran et al., 64 
2011; Thrall et al., 2012). In cooperative systems, cheats can behave analogous to parasites, 65 
such that similar evolutionary dynamics might arise. For instance, cooperators could adapt to 66 
the presence of cheats by: (a) an obligate reduction in cooperation; (b) a facultative reduction 67 
in cooperation when encountering cheats; or (c) making the cooperative trait less exploitable 68 
(Khare et al., 2009; Manhes & Velicer, 2011; Ghoul et al., 2014a; Levin et al., 2015). Cheats, 69 
meanwhile, could counter-adapt by: (d) evading any form of cheat recognition required for 70 
(b); or (e) improving their access to cooperators and their beneficial acts. In addition, it is also 71 
possible that cooperators and cheats adapt to abiotic conditions, which might allow social 72 
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traits to hitchhike along with beneficial non-social mutations (Morgan et al., 2012; Waite & 73 
Shou, 2012; Asfahl et al., 2015). 74 
 75 
We examined these possibilities by investigating the evolutionary response of repeatedly 76 
interacting cooperator and cheat strains to one another and to the abiotic environment in the 77 
bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Specifically, we co-evolved a producer of the 78 
shareable iron-scavenging molecule pyoverdine (i.e. cooperator) with a mutant that is 79 
defective in pyoverdine production but proficient in uptake (i.e. cheat) in iron-depleted media, 80 
where pyoverdine is important for growth. Pyoverdine is produced and secreted by P. 81 
aeruginosa in response to iron limitation, and is used to scavenge insoluble or host-bound 82 
iron from the environment (Schalk & Guillon, 2013). Numerous experiments have shown that 83 
secreted pyoverdine molecules can be shared with other cells in the community, including 84 
non-producing ‘cheats’ (Griffin et al., 2004; Harrison et al., 2006; Jiricny et al., 2010; Dumas 85 
& Kümmerli, 2012). 86 
 87 
We co-evolved populations of cooperators and cheats for 25 rounds of growth 88 
(approximately 150 generations), and followed cooperator frequency, population growth and 89 
pyoverdine production levels over time. Following evolution, we analysed evolved clones 90 
from different time points by using a combination of fitness assays, phenotypic assays, and 91 
whole-genome resequencing. This allowed us to examine, both at the proximate and ultimate 92 
level, the ability of cooperators and cheats to adapt to each other, and to disentangle co-93 
evolutionary dynamics from adaptations to the abiotic environment.  94 
 95 
Materials and Methods 96 
Strains 97 
We used P. aeruginosa PAO1 (ATCC 15692) as the wildtype cooperator strain, and the 98 
pyoverdine knock-out mutant PAO1∆pvdD (lacking the gene for the pyoverdine synthetase 99 
PvdD) as the cheating strain (Ghysels et al., 2004). To be able to distinguish cooperators 100 
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from cheats during co-evolution, we used variants of these strains constitutively expressing 101 
the green fluorescent protein GFP (PAO1-gfp and PAO1∆pvdD-gfp, chromosomal insertion: 102 
attTn7::Ptac-gfp). 103 
 104 
Experimental co-evolution 105 
Prior to experimental evolution, we grew strains overnight in 10 ml Lysogeny broth (LB). We 106 
then standardized cultures for cell density (optical density OD at 600 nm), and prepared two 107 
1:1 strain mixes (mix1: PAO1-gfp vs. PAO1∆pvdD; mix2: PAO1 vs. PAO1∆pvdD-gfp, to 108 
control for GFP-marker effects). We started experimental evolution by adding 106 cells into 109 
1.5 ml iron-depleted CAA medium in 16-fold replication (eight replicates for each mix) on a 110 
24-well plate. Iron-depleted CAA medium contained 5 g/l casamino acids, 1.18 g/l 111 
K2HPO4*3H2O, 0.25 g/l MgSO4*7H2O, 100 µg/ml human apo-transferrin, 20 mM NaHCO3 112 
and 25 mM HEPES buffer (all from Sigma-Aldrich, Switzerland). Apo-transferrin is a powerful 113 
natural iron chelator, which we used to bind ferric iron in the CAA media, thereby preventing 114 
siderophore-independent iron uptake. After a 24 hours growth period under static conditions 115 
at 37°C, during which approximately six generations occur (Dumas & Kümmerli, 2012), we 116 
carried out the following experimental steps: (i) we measured OD (at 600 nm) and 117 
pyoverdine production (fluorescence at excitation | emission = 400 | 460 nm) using a 118 
multimode plate reader (Tecan Infinite M200 PRO, Tecan Group Ltd., Switzerland) 119 
(Kümmerli et al., 2009c); (ii) we diluted culture aliquots to appropriate levels in 0.8 % NaCl, 120 
and plated 30 µl onto LB agar containing 100 µM FeCl3 to assess strain frequency (FeCl3 121 
was supplemented to suppress residual pyoverdine production, which can interfere with the 122 
GFP-signal); (iii) mixed 200 µl of the culture with 100 µl LB and 100 µl glycerol for long-term 123 
storage at -80°C; and (iv) transferred 15 µl of the culture to fresh medium (corresponding to a 124 
100-fold dilution) to initiate the next round of growth. We counted colony-forming units (CFU) 125 
on LB agar plates following a 48 h incubation period (24 h at 37°C followed by 24h at room 126 
temperature). We differentiated GFP-tagged from non-tagged colonies using a Dark Reader 127 
Transilluminator  (Clare Chemical Research, US). The above procedure was repeated for 25 128 
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consecutive rounds of growth, resulting in approximately 150 generations of experimental co-129 
evolution. 130 
 131 
Time-shift competition assays 132 
In order to test whether evolved cooperators became better at coping with cheats, and/or 133 
evolved cheats improved their ability to exploit cooperators, we competed ancestral and 134 
evolved clones from various time points against each other in all possible pairwise 135 
combinations. Specifically, we isolated a total of 896 clones (on average 8.8±1.8 and 9.5±1.2 136 
clones of cooperator and cheat origin, respectively) from the 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, and 25th 137 
round of growth. This was possible for 11 of the 16 replicates, where the two strains co-138 
existed for most of the experimental period (i.e. 3 replicates until 20th round; 8 replicates until 139 
25th round). In the other five replicates, cheats completely displaced cooperators, which 140 
concomitantly resulted in population collapse and extinction. For each round-replicate 141 
combination, we grew the isolated clones individually in 96-well plates in CAA without apo-142 
transferrin, conditions under which all clones reached similar OD after 24 hours (mean OD ± 143 
SE = 0.460±0.007). We then mixed equal volumes (50 µl) of all cooperator or cheat clones 144 
originating from the same round-replicate combination in Eppendorf tubes. With these mixes, 145 
we set up 1:1 competitions between cooperators and cheats in all possible pairwise 146 
combinations, such that cooperators competed against cheats from their past, presence and 147 
future. Following a 24 h competition period in iron-depleted CAA medium under static 148 
conditions at 37°C, we plated appropriately diluted fractions of the competition cultures onto 149 
LB plates.  Following a 48 h incubation period, we counted the GFP-tagged versus non-150 
tagged strains as described above. Using CFU data, we calculated the relative fitness of 151 
cheats as v = [x2(1-x1)]/[x1(1-x2)], where x1 and x2 are the starting and final frequency of 152 
cheats in the population, respectively. x1 was based on the ratios of the OD of the starting 153 
cultures, and was typically close to 0.5. We log-transformed all fitness values prior to 154 
analysis to obtain normally distributed residuals. 155 
 156 
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Growth and competition assays to test for adaptation to the media and/or the social 157 
environment 158 
We first tested for adaptation to the laboratory (abiotic) environment by growing 159 
monocultures of all 896 clones used for the time-shift competition assay in the medium they 160 
have evolved in (i.e. iron-depleted CAA). If clones significantly improve their growth 161 
performance in this assay, then this would indicate that strains have adapted to abiotic 162 
conditions. We measured OD at 600 nm of all clones after a 24 h static growth assay at 163 
37°C. OD after 24 hours is a good proxy for fitness under the strongly growth-limiting 164 
conditions imposed in our experiment because strains grow slowly, linearly over time, and do 165 
not reach carrying capacity within 24 hours (see Supporting Information Fig. S1 and 166 
(Kümmerli et al., 2009c). Thus, any beneficial mutation shortening the lag phase and/or 167 
increasing growth rate will result in higher OD. We scaled ODs of evolved strains relative to 168 
the ancestral wildtype.  169 
 170 
In addition to these clonal assays, we competed evolved cooperator and cheat clones (from 171 
the end of the co-evolution) directly against their respective ancestors in mixed culture (using 172 
the same protocol as described above). For this assay, it is important to note that competitive 173 
ability can still be influenced by both abiotic and social adaptations. Thus, if evolved 174 
cooperators were found to outcompete their ancestors, this could result from adaptation to 175 
media, as well as from the opportunity to exploit any surplus pyoverdine produced by 176 
ancestral strains. To disentangle social from abiotic fitness effects, we performed competition 177 
assays in iron-deplete media, where both social and abiotic adaptations should play a role, 178 
and iron-replete media, where pyoverdine is not needed and therefore only abiotic 179 
adaptations should matter. 180 
 181 
Another possibility to implement control treatments would have been to evolve cooperator 182 
and cheat strains in isolation from each other (Brockhurst & Koskella, 2013). However, this is 183 
difficult with our system because cheat monocultures grow poorly, such that these cultures 184 
Page 7 of 39 Journal of Evolutionary Biology
8 
would have likely gone extinct during the serial passages of the evolution regime (Supporting 185 
Information Fig. S2, and also see (Fiegna & Velicer, 2003). Furthermore, de novo cheats 186 
arise quickly in cooperator monocultures (Harrison et al., 2008; Dumas & Kümmerli, 2012), 187 
such that this treatment would have turned from a control into a co-evolution treatment. 188 
 189 
Sequencing and SNP analysis 190 
We sequenced the entire genome of 90 cooperator and 105 cheat clones from the end of the 191 
experimental co-evolution (R25 for 8 replicates, and R20 for 3 replicates) using Illumina 192 
HiSeq 2000. The evolved 195 clones were arranged in 30 pools as listed in Table S1 193 
(Supporting Information). We pooled the cheat clones originating from the same replicate (11 194 
pools in total). The cooperator clones were also pooled per replicate but also based on 195 
phenotypes. Specifically, we identified clones with significantly altered pyoverdine production 196 
levels in some replicates. For these replicates, we assembled the clones with and without 197 
changed pyoverdine production levels in separate pools (19 pools in total). Finally, we also 198 
sequenced our ancestral wildtype strain PAO1. 199 
 200 
We extracted genomic DNA using the Wizard Genomic DNA purification kit (Promega, 201 
Switzerland). Extracted DNA was sent off for commercial library preparation and sequencing 202 
with Illumina HiSeq 2000 using paired-end 50-bp reads (paired-end and single reads for 20 203 
and 11 pools, respectively; GATC Biotech, Germany). Data analysis was performed in 204 
collaboration with the Genetic Diversity Centre (GDC), ETH Zurich. In a first step, we 205 
mapped the contigs of our wildtype strain onto the reference genome of PAO1 (Stover et al., 206 
2000), PAO1-UW http://pseudomonas.com/index.jsp). The average sequence coverage was 207 
high (222), and the consensus length of our re-sequenced wildtype strain was 99.985% of 208 
the reference genome (6,264,404 bp). Reference and re-sequenced wildtype strain differed 209 
in 25 SNPs (10 non-synonymous, 5 synonymous, and 10 intergenic SNPs, see Supporting 210 
Information Table S2). Next, we mapped the contigs of our evolved clones onto the re-211 
sequenced genome of our ancestral wildtype strain. Whenever a single clone was 212 
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sequenced, we considered a putative mutation as a SNP if its frequency was ≥ 80%. In 213 
cases where clones were pooled for sequencing, we used the following threshold 214 
frequencies for putative mutations to be considered as SNPs (for 2 clones: frequency ≥ 25%, 215 
for 3 clones: frequency ≥ 16.7%, for 4 clones: frequency ≥ 12.5%, for 5 clones: frequency ≥ 216 
10%, for 6 clones: frequency ≥ 8.3%, for 7 clones: frequency ≥ 7.1%, for 8 clones: frequency 217 
≥ 6.3%, for 9 clones: frequency ≥ 5.6%, for 10 clones: frequency ≥ 5%). We discarded 218 
putative mutations with coverages < 15. Using these criteria, we identified 62 non-219 
synonymous SNPs in coding DNA sequences, and 19 SNPs in intergenic regions 220 
(Supporting Information Table S1). 221 
 222 
Swarming assays 223 
Because we identified SNPs in genes involved in flagella synthesis and chemotaxis (Table 224 
S1, for cooperators in 8 out of 11 replicates; for cheats in 9 out of 11 replicates), we tested 225 
whether clones isolated from pools with such SNPs showed altered motility phenotypes. For 226 
this analysis, we focused on a subset of samples (5 cooperator and cheat pools each). For 227 
each of the 31 cooperator and 45 cheat clones from these pools, we quantified swarming 228 
motility on 0.4% LB agar in 3-fold replication. Specifically, we grew clones overnight in 10 ml 229 
LB medium at 200 rpm at 37°C. We then washed cells in PBS (phosphate buffer saline), 230 
adjusted OD to 1, and added 2 µl of the cell solution to the centre of a Petri dish containing 231 
20 ml 0.4% LB agar. Dishes were incubated statically for 24 h at 37°C. Following incubation, 232 
the dishes were placed individually on 1 mm grid paper and photographed. We analysed the 233 
pictures with GIMP 2.8 (GNU Image Manipulation Program, freely available from 234 
http://www.gimp.org), by quantifying the number of pixels covered by the swarming colony. 235 
The 1 mm grid was used to calculate the surface s (in cm2) covered by the swarm. We then 236 
calculated the relative swarming of evolved strains as rs = (sevolved-sPAO1∆rhlA)/(sPAO1- sPAO1∆rhlA), 237 
where sevolved, sPAO1, sPAO1∆rhlA are the swarm surfaces of the evolved, ancestral wildtype, and 238 
a swarming-knockout strain (PAO1∆rhlA, which lacks the gene for the production of 239 
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rhamnolipids, biosurfactants essential for swarming), respectively. Evolved strains were 240 
considered swarming impaired if rs < 0.75. 241 
 242 
Simulating the effect of motility impairment on pyoverdine sharing 243 
SNPs in motility genes most likely represent adaptation to laboratory conditions (Ritchings et 244 
al., 1995; Velicer et al., 1998). However, motility deficiency potentially feeds back on social 245 
interactions between cooperators and cheats by limiting strain mixing, which in turn can 246 
reduce the cheats’ access to pyoverdine (see Kümmerli et al., 2009b). Because such a 247 
feedback is difficult to examine experimentally, we used a simulation platform specifically 248 
designed to study social interactions in microbes (Dobay et al., 2014). This platform provides 249 
a two-dimensional continuous landscape, in which public-goods-producing cooperators and 250 
non-producing cheats are seeded. Simulations typically start with one cooperator and one 251 
cheat cell, and stop when populations reach the carrying capacity K (number of individuals). 252 
Cooperator cells produce public good molecules at a specified rate p (molecules per second) 253 
and with specific properties (diffusion coefficient Dpg and durability δ). Public good production 254 
(per molecule) comes at a cost c, whereas public good uptake generates a benefit b. 255 
Cooperator and cheats can themselves diffuse (i.e. are motile), whereby Dco and Dch 256 
describe their respective diffusion coefficients. The fitness functions of cooperators and 257 
cheats are described in detail in Dobay et al. (2014), and are basically the sum of the intrinsic 258 
growth rate µ (not influenced by public goods), the benefits generated by public good uptake, 259 
and the cost of public goods production accruing to cooperators.  260 
 261 
As a baseline for our simulations, we chose parameter settings that closely match our 262 
experimental system – a liquid environment where cell and public good diffusion is relatively 263 
high, and where public goods are important for growth (p = 1, Dpg = 5 µm2s-1, δ = 510 s, c = 264 
0.001, b = 0.01, Dco = Dch = 5 µm2s-1, µ = 1, K = 500). With these settings, cheats significantly 265 
outcompete cooperators, demonstrating the fact that cheats can free ride on the public goods 266 
produced by cooperators. To investigate how motility impairment (as observed in our 267 
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experiment) feedbacks on the relative success of cooperators and cheats, we simulated 268 
situations in which cooperators and/or cheats acquire mutations reducing their cell diffusion 269 
coefficient from Dco = Dch = 5 to 0.5 µm2s-1. We simulated two scenarios, one where motility 270 
reduction is neutral (constant µ = 1), and one where motility reduction is beneficial, 271 
increasing µ by 0.2%. For each parameter combination, we ran 500 independent simulations.  272 
 273 
Statistical analysis 274 
We used linear models (LM) and linear mixed models (LMM) for statistical analyses. We 275 
tested whether the frequency of cheats, absolute and relative fitness, and levels of 276 
pyoverdine production changed over evolutionary time. Furthermore, we tested for 277 
correlations between genotypes (SNPs) and phenotypes (growth, pyoverdine production, 278 
and motility). Since repeated measures were taken from the same replicates over time, we 279 
included replicate ID as a random factor into our model. We also accounted for the fact that 280 
clones from the same replicate are not independent by averaging across clones prior to 281 
analysis. All statistical analyses were carried out with R 3.1.1 (R Development Core Team, 282 
2015). 283 
 284 
Results 285 
Evolutionary dynamics of strain frequency, growth and pyoverdine production 286 
We found that cheats significantly increased in frequency over evolutionary time (LMM: t332 = 287 
10.96, P < 0.0001); average cheat frequency rose rapidly during the first part of the 288 
experiment, but then levelled off (Fig. 1a). There was also a significant GFP-marker effect 289 
(LMM: t14 = 3.93, P = 0.0015), but only at the beginning of the experiment (significant 290 
interaction between round and marker: LMM: t332 = 6.32, P < 0.0001). When looking at 291 
individual replicates, we observed that cheats became fixed in 7 out of 16 replicates (fixation 292 
events occurred in rounds 13, 21, 23, and 25), whereas cooperators co-existed with cheats 293 
across the entire duration of the experiment (mean cheater frequency ± SE = 0.71±0.04) in 294 
the remaining 9 replicates. 295 
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During experimental evolution, both population growth (LMM: t382 = -10.16, P < 0.0001, Fig. 296 
1b) and population-level pyoverdine production (LMM: t382 = -15.41, P < 0.0001,Fig. 1c) 297 
significantly decreased over time. When comparing across replicates, we found that end 298 
point values of cheat frequency were significantly negatively correlated with evolved 299 
population growth (Pearson’s product-moment correlation: r = -0.894, df = 14, P < 0.0001), 300 
and evolved pyoverdine production levels (r = -0.764, df = 14, P = 0.0006) (Supporting 301 
Information Fig. S2), showing that the spreading of cheats typically drives population growth 302 
and pyoverdine production towards zero.  303 
 304 
Time-shift competition assays suggest co-evolutionary dynamics 305 
Among the replicates where cooperators and cheats co-existed for at least 20 experimental 306 
rounds, we found that cooperators from later evolutionary time points performed significantly 307 
better in competition with cheats than cooperators from earlier time points (Fig. 2a-f; LM: t319 308 
= -4.67, P < 0.0001). Similarly, cheats from later evolutionary time points became 309 
increasingly better at outcompeting cooperators (Fig. 2a-f), as indicated by the consistent 310 
significant positive relationships between cheat round of origin and relative cheat fitness (LM: 311 
t319 = 5.21, P < 0.0001). In contemporary competitions (i.e. competitions where cooperators 312 
and cheats originate from the same round), cheats significantly outcompeted cooperators (t58 313 
= 2.06, P = 0.044), suggesting that cooperators remained vulnerable to exploitation at any 314 
given moment in time. 315 
 316 
Abiotic and social adaptations influence evolutionary dynamics 317 
The competitive advantage of evolved strains in the time-shift experiment could not only 318 
have arisen due to social interactions, but also through adaptation to the abiotic environment. 319 
Our monoculture experiments, in which we grew evolved cooperator and cheat clones 320 
outside the social context, indeed suggest that media adaptation occurred: cooperator and 321 
cheat clones slightly but significantly improved their growth over evolutionary time (Fig. 3a, 322 
LMM for cooperators: t48 = 2.81, P = 0.007; for cheats: t48 = 2.17, P = 0.035). However, 323 
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another insight gained from these monoculture experiments was that the cooperators’ 324 
pyoverdine production levels significantly dropped over evolutionary time (Fig. 3b, LMM for 325 
cooperators: t48 = - 6.43, P < 0.0001), indicating that selection also acted on the social trait of 326 
interest. In support of the hypothesis that both social and abiotic adaptations drove the 327 
evolutionary dynamics observed in Fig. 2, we found that, in competitions between evolved 328 
and ancestral cooperators, the relative fitness of evolved cooperators was significantly higher 329 
under iron-deplete conditions, where both social and abiotic adaptations played a role, than 330 
under iron-replete conditions, where only abiotic adaptations mattered (Fig. 3c, paired t-test: 331 
t9 = 6.93, P < 0.0001). Competitions between ancestral and evolved cheats, meanwhile, 332 
were less informative because these cultures hardly managed to grow. But also here, we 333 
found evidence for media adaption since the evolved cheats grew slightly but significantly 334 
better than their ancestor (mean number of doublings in 24 hours: evolved vs. ancestral 335 
cheats = 2.53±0.40 vs. 0.41±0.11, paired t-test: t8 = 6.36, P = 0.0002). 336 
 337 
Sequencing analyses reveal mutations in social and non-social genes 338 
To better understand the genetic basis of the observed evolutionary dynamics, we 339 
sequenced genomes of 195 evolved clones from the end of the experiment. We found that 340 
non-synonymous SNPs repeatedly arose in three functionally different regions of the genome 341 
(Table S1), which correspond to: (a) sequences coding and regulating the iron starvation 342 
sigma factor pvdS (13 putative independent mutation events); (b) sequences coding for 343 
various genes involved in flagella synthesis and regulation (16 putative independent mutation 344 
events); and (c) sequences coding for genes involved in chemotaxis (11 putative 345 
independent mutation events). Intriguingly, mutations in all three regions were found both in 346 
the cooperator and the cheat background (number of events in cooperator vs. cheat 347 
background for pvdS region: 8/5; for flagella genes: 9/7; for chemotaxis genes: 4/7). 348 
 349 
 350 
 351 
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Phenotypes and fitness associated with SNPs in pvdS region 352 
There was a perfect association between reduced levels of pyoverdine production among 353 
cooperator clones and the presence of mutations in the pvdS region (Table S1). Specifically, 354 
clones with pvdS mutations showed significantly lower pyoverdine production levels than 355 
clones without pvdS mutations (pyoverdine production level relative to the ancestral wildtype, 356 
mean ± SE, for clones with pvdS mutations: 0.25±0.06; without pvdS mutations: 0.99±0.04; 357 
LM: F1,16 = 95.29, P < 0.0001; Fig. 4). Moreover, the presence/absence of pvdS mutations 358 
correlated with clonal fitness. Cooperator clones without pvdS mutations grew significantly 359 
better than clones with pvdS mutations (LM: F1,16 = 9.73, P = 0.007), and also better than the 360 
ancestral wildtype (t9 = 4.07, P = 0.0028, Fig. 4). Evolved clones with pvdS mutations varied 361 
a lot in their growth performance (in some cases growth decreased dramatically), but overall 362 
there was no significant drop in growth relative to the ancestral wildtype (t6 = -1.42, P = 363 
0.199, Fig. 4).  364 
 365 
Cheat clones with pvdS SNPs were phenotypically indistinguishable from the ancestral cheat 366 
and typically did not fix (i.e. the sequenced pools consisted of a mix of clones with and 367 
without mutations in pvdS, Table S1). For those reasons, we could not link mutations to 368 
fitness. However, there was one replicate (No. 8, Table S1) in which all sequenced cheat 369 
clones had a mutation in the pvdS region. These clones showed growth almost identical to 370 
their ancestor (mean growth ± SE: 0.99±0.03, t9 = 0.29, P = 0.78).  371 
 372 
Phenotypes and fitness associated with SNPs in flagella and chemotaxis genes 373 
Across the subset of sequenced pools analysed, we consistently found that the presence of 374 
SNPs in flagella and chemotaxis genes went along with the presence of clones showing 375 
significantly reduced swarming (mean relative swarming compared to the ancestral wildtype 376 
rs ± SE: 0.374±0.054). Evolved clones with motility impairment grew marginally significantly 377 
better than the ancestral wildtype (t10 = 2.06, P = 0.066, Fig. 5), but not significantly different 378 
from the evolved strains without motility impairment (F1,15 = 0.40, P = 0.537). 379 
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Simulations reveal that motility impairment promotes cooperation 380 
Our experiments were carried out in static liquid medium, where flagellated wildtype bacteria 381 
can easily mix and siderophores can readily diffuse. Under such conditions, cheats typically 382 
outcompete cooperators (Griffin et al., 2004; Kümmerli et al., 2009b). However, how do the 383 
competitive abilities change when strains become motility impaired as observed in our co-384 
evolution experiment? To address this question, we used computer simulations where we 385 
could manipulate bacterial motility in a fully controlled in silico environment (see Materials 386 
and Methods for details). When simulating ancestral conditions, where bacteria are highly 387 
motile, we indeed found that cooperators lose in competition with cheats (cooperator 388 
frequency drops from 0.5 to 0.256). Next, we implemented our empirical observation that 389 
strains became motility impaired. When assuming that motility impairment confers no fitness 390 
benefit, our simulations reveal that cooperators increase in frequency, relative to the 391 
standard conditions described above, no matter whether motility impairment occurred in 392 
cooperators (frequency increase from 0.256 to 0.319), cheats (from 0.256 to 0.264), or both 393 
strains (from 0.256 to 0.370). Finally, we simulated the case where motility impairment 394 
confers a small fitness benefit and where both strains became motility impaired (as observed 395 
in our experiment). Also under these conditions, we found that cooperators increased in 396 
relative frequency (from 0.256 to 0.399). These results indicate that motility impairment 397 
benefits cooperators more than cheats because it leads to more local sharing of public goods 398 
among cooperators. 399 
 400 
Discussion 401 
Our co-evolution study with P. aeruginosa revealed that pyoverdine-producing cooperators 402 
could co-exist with pyoverdine-exploiting cheats across 150 bacterial generations in the 403 
majority (56%) of replicates. Our phenotypic and sequencing analyses suggest that co-404 
existence was fostered by cooperators and cheats adapting to both one another and the 405 
abiotic environment. Adaptations to the co-evolving opponent included cooperators 406 
significantly down-regulating their pyoverdine production, which lowered the overall level of 407 
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cooperation, and cheats blocking costly pyoverdine signalling, which is triggered upon 408 
pyoverdine uptake. Adaptations to the abiotic environment included a reduction in motility, 409 
which could potentially feed back on social interactions between cooperators and cheats by 410 
limiting strain mixing and pyoverdine sharing.  411 
 412 
We found that an obligate reduction in cooperation by 75%, owing to point mutations in the 413 
gene and promoter region of the iron starvation sigma factor PvdS arose repeatedly in many 414 
replicates. This illustrates how the presence of cheats can favour public good producers to 415 
reduce their level of cooperation (Dumas & Kümmerli, 2012; Ghoul et al., 2014a). However, 416 
these partial pyoverdine producers hardly ever fixed, such that populations generally 417 
consisted of a mixture of ancestral full-pyoverdine producers, evolved partial-pyoverdine 418 
producers and non-producers. The evolved partial-pyoverdine producers could therefore take 419 
on a double role in the population: they can be regarded as cooperators in competition with 420 
the non-producer, but potentially act as cheats in competition with the ancestral wildtype 421 
pyoverdine producer (Ghoul et al., 2014b). Further work is required to determine if this 422 
diversity of pyoverdine strategies can remain stable in the long run, by a mechanism such as 423 
frequency-dependent selection (Ross-Gillespie et al., 2007; MacLean & Gudelj, 2006; Ross-424 
Gillespie et al., 2015). 425 
 426 
We further observed that point mutations in the iron starvation sigma factor region also 427 
repeatedly occurred in the cheat background. The spreading of these mutants can be 428 
explained by the fact that our ancestral cheat (defective for the pyoverdine synthetase PvdD) 429 
is still receptive to pyoverdine-mediated signalling (Lamont et al., 2002), whereby the uptake 430 
of pyoverdine triggers the expression of genes involved in the synthesis of pyoverdine 431 
precursors. Signalling is silent when cheats grow in monoculture, but becomes activated in 432 
co-culture with pyoverdine producers (Tiburzi et al., 2008), consequently leading to 433 
substantial costs associated with cheating. These costs can be eliminated by mutations in 434 
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the iron starvation sigma factor (Tiburzi et al., 2008). Thus, the spreading of these mutations 435 
can be understood as a direct response to the presence of cooperators. 436 
 437 
What role do adaptations to the abiotic environment, such as the observed reduction in 438 
motility, play in the co-evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and cheats? Previous 439 
work suggested that cooperative traits could hitchhike along with mutations that provide 440 
benefits outside the social context (Morgan et al., 2012; Waite & Shou, 2012; Asfahl et al., 441 
2015). The reasoning is that in cooperative systems cheats must invade from rare, and 442 
therefore any beneficial (non-social) mutation is more likely to occur among cooperators 443 
because they are more numerous. This could finally result in selective sweeps, during which 444 
the beneficial mutation fixes, the cooperative trait hitchhikes along, and cheats are purged 445 
(Waite & Shou, 2012). We did not find support for this scenario. For one thing, we started 446 
with equal proportions of cooperators and cheats such that hitchhiking could work in favour 447 
of both strains depending on in which background the beneficial (non-social) mutation arises 448 
first. However, even when taking this into account, we found no clear evidence for hitchhiking 449 
based on selective sweeps. One reason for the absence of large-scale hitchhiking might be 450 
that motility impairment seems to confer only small fitness benefits (Fig. 5). Moreover, 451 
simulations suggest that motility impairment feeds back on the social interaction between 452 
cooperators and cheats as it limits strain mixing, which in turn can lead to more local sharing 453 
of public goods among cooperators, hampering the selective advantage of cheats. Taken 454 
together, our findings indicate that adaptations to the abiotic environment can interact with 455 
social components of the environment, and do not necessarily favour hitchhiking. 456 
 457 
Do the observed adaptations indicate that cooperators and cheats engage in antagonistic co-458 
evolution, characterized by cooperators becoming resistant against cheating and cheats 459 
improving exploitation abilities? The answer is ‘no’, as we did not observe cooperators to 460 
evolve mechanisms preventing public good exploitation whilst maintaining high levels of 461 
cooperation. Nonetheless, in our study the evolution of reduced pyoverdine production and 462 
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the feedback of motility impairment on social interactions significantly helped to reduce the 463 
burden of cheating and allowed cooperators to co-exist with cheats for much longer periods 464 
than would be expected based on the results from short-term invasion experiments (Griffin et 465 
al., 2004; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2007; Kümmerli et al., 2009c). Furthermore, the mutations in 466 
the iron starvation sigma factor increased the relative fitness of cheats when grown with 467 
cooperators that produced pyoverdine. Thus, whilst we did not observe antagonistic co-468 
evolution, we did observe both cooperators and cheats becoming better adapted to a social 469 
environment that includes the other type.  470 
 471 
Would the observed response of cooperators, to reduce pyoverdine production and impair 472 
motility, help sustain some level of cooperation in the long run? Again, the answer is ‘no’. 473 
First of all, we observed cheat fixation in 7 out of 16 replicates. This is by itself not surprising 474 
because we chose experimental conditions that are highly unfavourable for cooperation, as 475 
we combined high costs of cooperation (induced by strong iron limitation) with low 476 
relatedness (thousands of cells were transferred and no population structure was 477 
implemented) (Griffin et al., 2004; Kümmerli et al., 2009a). Second, even in the remaining 9 478 
replicates, where strains co-existed more stably, the long-term persistence of cooperation is 479 
not guaranteed, as exemplified by the evolutionary dynamics observed in replicate no. 11 480 
(Table S1). In this replicate, a motility-reducing flagella mutation fixed early among 481 
cooperator clones, allowing the evolved cooperators to co-exist with cheats. Subsequently, 482 
two independent mutations in the iron starvation sigma factor occurred that resulted in the 483 
complete abolishment of pyoverdine production, such that the final population consisted of a 484 
mixture of ancestral and de novo evolved pyoverdine non-producers. Although reflecting an 485 
extreme case, this example shows that a single point mutation suffices to turn a reasonably 486 
well-adapted cooperator into a de novo cheat. These considerations suggest that some form 487 
of population structure, generating significant levels of relatedness among interacting 488 
individuals (i.e. public goods are more likely shared among cooperators), might be required 489 
Page 18 of 39Journal of Evolutionary Biology
19 
to further stabilize cooperation (Griffin et al., 2004; MacLean & Gudelj, 2006; Diggle et al., 490 
2007; Kümmerli et al., 2009a; Rumbaugh et al., 2012). 491 
 492 
Finally, we can speculate about whether cheating resistance is possible in our system and 493 
what putative mechanisms could confer it. The evolution of cheating resistance combined 494 
with sustained high levels of cooperation was indeed observed in a study where only 495 
cooperators but not cheats were allowed to evolve (Santorelli et al., in preparation). While 496 
the underlying resistance mechanism remained unclear in this particular study, cheating 497 
resistance could principally evolve via a modified, more specific pyoverdine that is no longer 498 
accessible to cheats. This scenario has indeed previously been put forward to explain the 499 
existing pyoverdine diversity (Smith et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2012), and has also been 500 
suggested to drive diversification in bacterial quorum-sensing communication systems 501 
(Eldar, 2011). One reason for why diversification did not appear in our experiment might be 502 
that at least two mutations are required to change pyoverdine specificity – one that alters 503 
pyoverdine structure and one that adjusts receptor specificity accordingly. The odds for this 504 
to occur within our relatively short experimental period are conceivably low. Thus, the 505 
question of whether cooperator-cheat antagonism can drive diversification in social systems 506 
remains still open. 507 
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Figure captions 648 
Fig. 1 Evolutionary dynamics of cheat frequency (a), population growth (b), and pyoverdine 649 
production levels (c) in mixed populations of cooperative pyoverdine producers and non-650 
pyoverdine-producing cheats of the bacterium P. aeruginosa. Experimental evolution 651 
occurred across 25 rounds of growth (approximately 150 bacterial generations). Cheat 652 
frequency first increased and then levelled off. Population growth and pyoverdine production 653 
significantly dropped over time. Grey lines depict averages across 16 replicates. Blue and 654 
orange lines show replicates in which the cooperator or cheat strain was labelled with a 655 
neutral GFP marker, respectively. 656 
 657 
Fig. 2 Relative cheat fitness as a function of the evolutionary origin of cheats (along the x-658 
axis) and cooperators (from a to f). Origin of both cheats and cooperators significantly 659 
affected cheat fitness, as indicated by the dashed trend lines, and the overall reduction in 660 
cheat fitness when moving from (a) to (f). These patterns suggest that cooperators from later 661 
evolutionary time points were less exploitable by cheats, and that cheats from later 662 
evolutionary time points became increasingly better at outcompeting cooperators. Blue, red 663 
and grey circles indicate combinations where cooperators competed against cheats from 664 
their past, future, and presence, respectively. Circles above or below the zero-line indicate 665 
that cheats won or lost the competition, respectively.  666 
 667 
Fig. 3 Experiments testing for media versus social adaptations. (a) Growth of evolved clones 668 
in monocultures slightly but significantly increased over evolutionary time both for 669 
cooperators (blue lines) and cheats (green lines) indicating adaptation to the media outside 670 
the social context. (b) Analysis of the clonal pyoverdine production profiles revealed a 671 
significant drop over evolutionary time, suggesting that also the social trait of interest was 672 
under selection. (c) Evolved clones consistently outcompeted their ancestors both in iron-673 
replete and iron-deplete environments (selection coefficient > 0). In support of the hypothesis 674 
that both social and abiotic adaptations drove the evolutionary dynamics observed in our 675 
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system, we found that the selection coefficient of evolved cooperators was significantly 676 
higher under iron-deplete conditions, where both social and abiotic adaptations were 677 
important, than under iron-replete conditions, where only abiotic adaptations matter. All 678 
values in (a) and (b) are scaled relative to the ancestral wildtype, and represent means 679 
across clones from the same replicate. Colour shadings depict the different replicates and 680 
dashed lines represent significant trendlines.  681 
 682 
Fig. 4 Relationship between SNP mutations in the iron starvation sigma factor PvdS, 683 
pyoverdine production and fitness of evolved cooperator clones. Evolved clones with SNPs 684 
in the PvdS region (red circles) produced significantly less pyoverdine and had significantly 685 
lower fitness than evolved clones without SNPs in the PvdS region (blue circles). All values 686 
are scaled relative to the ancestral wildtype (dashed lines). Closed circles depict means 687 
across clones from the same replicate and mutation event, while open circles represent 688 
averages across replicates. 689 
 690 
Fig. 5 Relationship between swarming motility and fitness of evolved clones isolated at the 691 
end of the evolution experiment. Swarming assays revealed that a large number of evolved 692 
clones were motility impaired (red circles, rs < 0.75). Evolved clones with motility impairment 693 
grew marginally significantly better than the ancestral wildtype, but not different from evolved 694 
strains without motility impairment (blue circles). All values are scaled relative to the 695 
ancestral wildtype (dashed lines). Closed circles depict means across clones from the same 696 
replicate and mutation event, while open circles represent averages across replicates. 697 
 698 
Page 26 of 39Journal of Evolutionary Biology
27 
Supporting Information 699 
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article: 700 
 701 
Figure S1 Continuous linear growth of ancestral cooperator (blue line) and cheat (red line) 702 
monocultures in iron-depleted CAA medium. Solid and dotted lines depict mean and 95% 703 
confidence intervals across 24 replicates, respectively. 704 
 705 
Figure S2 At the end of the evolution experiment, the evolved community level pyoverdine 706 
production (a) and population growth (b) were significantly negatively correlated with the 707 
proportion of cheats, showing that cheat accumulation first drives cooperation and then the 708 
entire population to extinction. Dashed lines indicate trend lines. Filled and open circles 709 
represent replicates in which the cooperator or cheat strain was labelled with a neutral GFP 710 
marker, respectively. 711 
 712 
Table S1 Non-synonymous and intergenic SNPs in evolved cooperator and cheat clones 713 
 714 
Table S2 SNPs of the PAO1 wildtype strain used in this study compared to the reference 715 
PAO1-UW (http://pseudomonas.com) 716 
 717 
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Table&S1&Non$synonymous)and)intergenic)SNPs)in)evolved)cooperator)and)cheat)clones)(see)below)for)color)code)
replicate&
ID
strain sequence&
pool
clones&
pooled
position locus&tag gene function reference&
nucleotide
mutation&
nucleotide
amino&acid&
change
frequency&
mutation
coverage
2 cooperator seq02 2 2722485 PA2426 pvdS iron)starvation)sigma)factor C T Ser104Leu 1.000 167
seq01 5 1581399 PA1452 flhA flagellar)biosynthesis)protein T A Leu360Gln 0.468 188
seq01 5 6258906 PA5565 gidA glucose$inhibited)division)protein)A G T Gln98Lys 0.102 157
cheat seq03 10 1168303 PA1082 flgG flagellar)basal$body)rod)protein T G Val7Gly 0.596 225
seq03 10 1590403 PA1459 hypothetical probable)chemotaxis)signal)transduction)methyltransferase C T Leu356Phe 0.300 217
seq03 10 5051522 PA4513 hypothetical probable)oxidoreductase G C Arg627Gly 0.104 164
3 cooperator seq04 7 1590022 PA1459 hypothetical probable)chemotaxis)signal)transduction)methyltransferase G A Ala229Thr 0.215 158
seq04 7 1590025 PA1459 hypothetical probable)chemotaxis)signal)transduction)methyltransferase G A Glu230Lys 0.191 162
seq04 7 1586410 PA1457 cheZ chemotaxis)protein A C His126Pro 0.158 202
seq04 7 1192834 PA1101 fliF flagella)M$ring)outer)membrane)protein)precursor T C Phe144Leu 0.134 186
cheat seq05 5 1192834 PA1101 fliF flagella)M$ring)outer)membrane)protein)precursor T T Phe144Leu 0.395 205
seq05 5 1580235 NA intergenic upstream)of)flagellar)biosynthesis)protein)FlhA A G NA 0.220 209
seq05 5 118825 PA0097 hypothetical unknown G A Gly299Ser 0.205 303
seq05 5 4776647 PA4270 rpoB DNA$directed)RNA)polymerase)beta)chain A T Val1324Glu 0.156 333
seq05 5 3650180 PA3262 hypothetical probable)peptidyl$prolyl)cis$trans)isomerase,)FkbP$type G C Ala96Gly 0.117 128
4 cooperator seq06 4 1570790 PA1441 fliK putative)flagellar)hook$length)control)protein C T Gln99* 0.515 204
seq06 4 3762307 PA3350 hypothetical flagellar)basal)body)P$ring)biosynthesis)protein T C Leu116Pro 0.243 226
cheat seq07 10 1030269 PA0940 hypothetical unknown G C Ala48Gly 0.238 244
seq07 10 3888238 PA3475 pheC cyclohexadienyl)dehydratase)precursor C A Leu249Phe 0.133 128
seq07 10 1433126 NA intergenic upstream)of)probable)TonB)dependent)receptor C A NA 0.131 236
seq07 10 4246263 PA3789 hypothetical uncharacterized)iron$regulated)membrane)protein A C Val459Gly 0.130 138
seq07 10 4706190 PA2019 mexG multidrug)efflux)membrane)fusion)protein)precursor G C Gly79Arg 0.114 185
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replicate&
ID
strain sequence&
pool
clones&
pooled
position locus&tag gene function reference&
nucleotide
mutation&
nucleotide
amino&acid&
change
frequency&
mutation
coverage
5 cooperator seq08 1 1171084 PA1085 flgJ flagellar)protein C T Ser48Leu 1.000 251
seq09 6 2722637 PA2426 pvdS iron)starvation)sigma)factor A C Thr155Pro 1.000 80
seq09 6 4917629 NA intergenic upstream)of)GroES)co$chaperonin C A NA 0.178 90
cheat seq10 10 1191982 NA intergenic uptstream)of)flagellar)hook$basal)body)complex)protein)FliE A G NA 0.570 207
seq10 10 2590446 PA2345 hypothetical conserved)hypothetical)protein G C Ala407Gly 0.170 94
seq10 10 1060494 NA intergenic upstream)of)hypothetical)protein C T NA 0.161 279
6 cooperator seq12 6 2722637 PA2426 pvdS iron)starvation)sigma)factor A C Thr155Pro 1.000 83
seq11 4 1580235 NA intergenic upstream)of)flagellar)biosynthesis)protein)FlhA A G NA 0.597 216
seq12 6 5444367 PA4849 hypothetical unknown C G Ala39Gly 0.207 87
seq12 6 714235 PA0660 hypothetical dioxygenases)related)to)2$nitropropane)dioxygenase C T Ala5Thr 0.165 127
cheat seq13 10 1589452 PA1459 hypothetical probable)chemotaxis)signal)transduction)methyltransferase G T Glu39* 0.769 78
seq13 10 5474135 PA4878 brlR transcriptional)regulator)involved)in)efflux)pump)regulation A G Ile124Val 0.185 108
seq13 10 292176 PA0260 hypothetical unknown G C Arg377Gly 0.183 82
seq13 10 1189979 PA1098 fleS two$component)sensor)regulating)motility)and)adhesion C T Gln270* 0.181 94
seq13 10 2722079 NA intergenic promoter)region)of)iron)starvation)sigma)factor)PvdS G T NA 0.158 95
7 cooperator seq14 8 no)SNPs)discovered
cheat seq15 10 1165379 PA1079 flgD flagellar)basal$body)rod)modification)protein T G Val80Gly 0.180 100
8 cooperator seq17 1 2722079 NA intergenic promoter)region)of)iron)starvation)sigma)factor)PvdS G T NA 1.000 111
seq16 9 4732864 PA4225 pchF pyochelin)synthetase G C Ala1312Gly 0.235 68
cheat seq18 10 2722275 PA2426 pvdS promoter)region)of)iron)starvation)sigma)factor)PvdS G A Gly34Asp 1.000 60
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replicate&
ID
strain sequence&
pool
clones&
pooled
position locus&tag gene function reference&
nucleotide
mutation&
nucleotide
amino&acid&
change
frequency&
mutation
coverage
11 cooperator seq19 10 1183369 PA1092 fliC flagellar)filament)protein)(flagellin)type)B) C G Asn104Lys 1.000 89
seq19 10 2722079 NA intergenic promoter)region)of)iron)starvation)sigma)factor)PvdS G T NA 0.920 112
seq19 10 25077 PA0023 qor quinone)oxidoreductase C G Ala157Pro 0.213 75
seq19 10 2722313 PA2426 pvdS iron)starvation)sigma)factor T C Phe47Leu 0.059 85
cheat seq20 10 1581291 PA1452 flhA flagellar)biosynthesis)protein C T Ala324Val 0.491 108
seq20 10 1589707 PA1459 hypothetical probable)chemotaxis)signal)transduction)methyltransferase G T Glu124* 0.237 118
seq20 10 2722079 NA intergenic promoter)region)of)iron)starvation)sigma)factor)PvdS G T NA 0.202 114
14 cooperator seq21 8 no)SNPs)discovered
seq22 2 2722079 NA intergenic promoter)region)of)iron)starvation)sigma)factor)PvdS G T NA 1.000 93
seq22 2 3683814 PA3290 hypothetical unknown T C Tyr112Cys 0.532 124
cheat seq23 10 1590283 PA1459 hypothetical probable)chemotaxis)signal)transduction)methyltransferase G A Gly316Ser 0.909 33
15 cooperator seq24 1 4310610 PA3849 hypothetical unknown C A Ala236Glu 1.000 74
seq25 7 1184318 PA1092 fliC flagellar)filament)protein)(flagellin)type)B) G T Ala421Ser 0.378 336
seq25 7 1011727 PA0926 hypothetical unknown G C Ala74Gly 0.156 128
seq25 7 1022517 PA0933 ygcA probable)RNA)methyltransferase C G Ala301Gly 0.155 116
seq25 7 4005940 PA3573 hypothetical probable)major)facilitator)superfamily)(MFS))transporter C G Arg69Pro 0.138 109
seq25 7 1050271 NA intergenic upstream)of)pqsR$mediated)PQS)regulator T C NA 0.126 135
seq25 7 107333 PA0089 tssG1 protein)secretion)by)the)type)VI)secretion)system C G Ala51Gly 0.106 180
seq25 7 5726985 PA5088 hypothetical unknown G C Ala85Gly 0.101 287
cheat seq26 10 1586742 PA1457 cheZ chemotaxis)protein C T Gln237* 0.374 206
seq26 10 2722079 NA intergenic promoter)region)of)iron)starvation)sigma)factor)PvdS G T NA 0.202 183
seq26 10 3226658 PA2873 tgpA transglutaminase)protein)A C T Gly244Arg 0.146 199
seq26 10 4917629 NA intergenic upstream)of)GroES)co$chaperonin C A NA 0.118 136
seq26 10 5242140 NA intergenic unknown T C NA 0.101 328
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replicate&
ID
strain sequence&
pool
clones&
pooled
position locus&tag gene function reference&
nucleotide
mutation&
nucleotide
amino&acid&
change
frequency&
mutation
coverage
16 coop seq27 1 1193389 PA1101 fliF Flagella)M$ring)outer)membrane)protein)precursor G T Gly329Trp 1.000 73
seq28 5 1590244 PA1459 hypothetical probable)chemotaxis)signal)transduction)methyltransferase G A Ala303Thr 1.000 167
seq29 3 2722095 NA intergenic promoter)region)of)iron)starvation)sigma)factor)PvdS C T NA 1.000 20
seq28 5 3992219 PA3562 fruI phosphotransferase)system)transporter)enzyme)I G T Asp731Glu 0.293 58
seq28 5 1050271 NA intergenic upstream)of)pqsR$mediated)PQS)regulator T C NA 0.289 97
seq28 5 643452 PA0585 hypothetical hypothetical)protein G C Ala88Gly 0.132 152
seq28 5 4624957 PA4135 hypothetical probable)transcriptional)regulator C G Arg16Pro 0.126 119
seq28 5 5402008 NA intergenic upstream)of)fdnG)$formate)dehydrogenase$O,)major)subunit C G NA 0.118 170
seq28 5 3953659 PA3534 hypothetical probable)oxidoreductase A C Val317Gly 0.113 177
seq28 5 5950551 PA5286 hypothetical conserved)hypothetical)protein T G Thr102Pro 0.108 240
seq28 5 5042244 PA4503 hypothetical probable)permease)of)ABC)transporter C A Asp59Glu 0.104 183
seq28 5 4131732 PA3690 hypothetical probable)metal$transporting)P$type)ATPase G C Arg66Pro 0.103 146
seq28 5 4372668 PA3903 prfC peptide)chain)release)factor)3 G C Ala234Pro 0.101 148
cheat seq30 10 2722079 NA intergenic promoter)region)of)iron)starvation)sigma)factor)PvdS G T NA 0.647 153
seq30 10 1590253 PA1459 hypothetical probable)chemotaxis)signal)transduction)methyltransferase C T Leu306Phe 0.173 133
seq30 10 1590218 PA1459 hypothetical probable)chemotaxis)signal)transduction)methyltransferase C A Ala294Asp 0.130 131
Color&code
SNPs)in)pvdS)region
SNPs)in)flagella)genes)or)putative)regulatory)sequences
SNPs)in)chemotaxis)genes
other)SNPs
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Table&S2&SNPs%of%the%PAO1%wildtype%strain%used%in%this%study%compared%to%the%reference%PAO1:UW
position locus&tag gene function reference&
nucleotide
mutation&
nucleotide
amino&acid&
change
frequency&
mutation
coverage
non#synonymous(SNPs
183697 PA0159 hypo:
thetical
probable%transcriptional%regulator T G Cys310Trp 1.000 372
1589438 PA1459 hypo:
thetical
probable%chemotaxis%signal%
transduction%methyltransferase
G C Gly34Ala 1.000 285
2669175 PA2400 pvdJ non:ribosomal%peptide%synthetase%
involved%in%pyoverdine%synthesis
G C Pro819Ala 1.000 249
2807982 PA2492 mexT transcriptional%regulator T A Phe172Ile 1.000 149
2808180 PA2492 mexT transcriptional%regulator C A Pro238Thr 1.000 153
4212201 PA3760 NA N:Acetyl:D:Glucosamine%
phosphotransferase%system%transporter
A G His636Arg 1.000 207
4869855 PA4341 hypo:
thetical
probable%transcriptional%regulator T G Glu158Asp 1.000 249
4924552 PA4394 hypo:
thetical
unknown C G Val178Leu 0.939 230
5743462 PA5100 hutU urocanase G C Thr431Arg 0.930 185
6115455 PA5434 mtr tryptophan%permease T G Lys286Asn 1.000 340
synonymous(SNPs
4344266 PA3877 narK1 nitrite%extrusion%protein%1 A G 1.000 185
4924553 PA4394 hypo:
thetical
unknown G C 0.964 225
5743461 PA5100 hutU urocanase C G 0.956 180
6079222 PA5399 dgcB oxidoreductase%involved%in%
dimethylglycine%catabolism
A G 1.000 242
6098781 PA5418 soxA sarcosine%oxidase%alpha%subunit G C 1.000 283
intergenic(SNPs
413850 NA NA NA T C 1.000 119
721611 NA NA NA C T 1.000 127
721622 NA NA NA C T 1.000 136
721718 NA NA NA A G 0.992 129
721725 NA NA NA C T 0.990 105
721740 NA NA NA C T 1.000 98
2239547 NA NA NA T G 1.000 177
4448855 NA NA NA C G 1.000 58
4448856 NA NA NA G C 1.000 59
5036891 NA NA NA A C 1.000 312
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